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Object recognition entails a complex interplay between top-down and bottom-up signals.  
Yet, limited research has investigated the mechanisms through which top-down 
processes, such as task context and behavioral goals impact the neural basis of visual 
object processing.  Using electroencephalography (EEG), we studied the temporal 
dynamics of task and object processing to identify how early the impact of task can be 
observed.  We recorded ERPs from participants as they viewed object images from four 
categories spanning animacy (Inanimate: roller-skate, motorbike; Animate: cow, 
butterfly) and size (Large: motorbike, cow; Small: roller-skate, butterfly) dimensions 
under four task conditions comprising conceptual (naturalness, size) and perceptual 
(color, tilt) dimensions.  We did not find evidence of behavioral goals, as manipulated by 
the task context, modulating early visual object representations, as indexed by early 
visual ERPs (P1, N1, P2), in extrastriate cortex.  Additional analyses revealed that task-
related processing occurred predominately in later time windows (300-600ms) within 
frontoparietal regions.  Irrespective of task, we also observed a variety of object category 
effects across early visual ERPs.  These findings support previous neuroimaging results 
suggesting object representations in occipitotemporal cortex are organized based on their 
animacy and real-world size, and, importantly, these ERP results indicate these 
 
 iv 
organizational principles can be observed in relatively early stages along the visual 
processing hierarchy.  Taken together, this work adds to the body of psychological and 
neuroscientific research examining how and when top-down and bottom-up signals 
interact to form the basis of visual object processing, facilitating of high-level vision.   
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Human visual perception entails a complex interplay between top-down and 
bottom-up signals yielding fast and accurate object recognition (Albright, 2012).  To 
date, limited research has investigated the mechanisms through which top-down 
processes, such as behavioral relevance and expectation impacts the neural basis of visual 
object recognition.  Traditional bottom-up theories of perception describe visual 
information processing within a hierarchical system, in which early visual processing 
feeds into conceptual systems, but conceptual systems do not alter early visual encoding 
(Pylyshyn, 1999, Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000).  Recent neuroimaging findings, 
however, have demonstrated that observer goals (manipulated by task context) influence 
visual object processing across the cortex (Harel, Kravitz, & Baker, 2014).  Neural 
representations of identical object stimuli were modulated by the task context under 
which the objects were presented.  While these findings revealed where task context 
influenced object representations in the cortex, they did not uncover when these effects 
emerged in time (i.e., early vs. late).  The objective of the current study was to use 
electroencephalography (EEG) to understand the time course of such top-down task 
effects on visual object processing.  Specifically, we examined whether task flexibly 
shaped object representations in early visual areas reflecting top-down modulation on 
visual encoding, or whether these effects manifest later within frontoparietal regions?  
EEG allowed us to identify when task impacted visual perception, which provided insight 
into the temporal relationship between perception and cognition.  
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Our ability to quickly and accurately detect objects in our environment, recognize 
them as objects that we have seen before, and categorize them at multiple levels (e.g., 
animal, bird, Robin) disguises the immense computational challenges presented to the 
visual system.  Despite variations in how objects present themselves to the retina (i.e., the 
unique patterns of photons activated), the visual system can extract the relevant physical 
properties (i.e., shape, color, edges), selectively attend to diagnostic information within 
the visual environment, and rapidly apply semantic meaning to objects in just fractions of 
a second (Thorpe, Fize, Marlot, 1996).  For example, to categorize whether an object is 
natural (rather than manmade) the visual system may attend to smooth textural 
information and/or low spatial frequency content as diagnostic cues to differentiate 
natural from manmade objects (Schyns, 1998).  In addition to the perceptual properties of 
the object, the underlying cognitive processes within the observer also influence 
categorization.  The diagnostic recognition framework (Schyns, 1998) establishes 
categorization as a flexible process whereby objects can be placed into various categories 
depending on internal (e.g., goals, attention) and external (e.g., environment, context) 
factors.  That is, categorization not only reflects the availability of perceptual 
information, but also internal biases of the observer.  In the above example, the demands 
of the task alter what is diagnostic for categorization.  Thus, categorical judgments are 
flexible.  But do the demands of a categorization task flexibly adapt how one perceives an 
object?  In other words, does perceptual processing follow the constraints of the task at 
hand or is it task-independent?   
Cognitive Penetrability of Visual Perception 
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The degree to which visual encoding is influenced by cognitive factors, and/or 
executed through a passive, data-driven system is a central debate in cognitive science 
(Fodor, 1983; Schyns, 1998; Pylyshyn, 1999; Lupyan, 2015).  Visual perception is often 
colloquially used as a broad term to describe perceptual and cognitive mechanisms (e.g., 
beliefs, utilities, expectations).  While these processes certainly combine to influence how 
the visual world is interpreted, the extent to which visual perception and cognition are 
distinct components, and precisely when and where they interact is still in question.  The 
classical framework proposed that visual perception is accomplished additively, in which 
physical properties of a stimulus are extracted, encoded, and reconstructed hierarchically 
within an encapsulated, modular system (Fodor, 1983; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000).  
Modular perceptual systems contain innate, neural modules that are restricted to 
processing direct inputs and are unable to access information stored elsewhere in the 
system, such as knowledge and/or beliefs.  “Early vision” is a term championed by Marr 
(1982) and Pylyshyn (1999) to describe the part of visual perception that is impervious to 
cognitive influence; early perceptual analysis must be contained within an unconscious 
system operating independently of top-down influence because interactions on rapid 
processing would introduce critical perceptual delays and potential errors.  They argue 
that cognitive factors such as one’s existing prior knowledge, experiences, and memories 
interact with visual percepts in later processing stages and do not penetrate early visual 
perception.  The extent to which the functional architecture of primary visual cortex and 
the ventral visual pathway support this modularized, hierarchical framework has recently 
come into question (Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider & Mishkin, 2013).   
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Neural framework.  Object processing in the visual cortex has been typically 
characterized as following a rigid, feedforward hierarchy (Hubel & Wiesel, 1968; 
Maunsell & Newsome, 1987).  Neurons with small receptive fields in early visual areas 
are sensitive to basic features (e.g., edges, orientation, direction of movement, color) and 
project to neurons with larger receptive fields that code more complex features.  These 
connections have been described to be local on each level and follow a rigid hierarchy, 
without influence of feedback or top down connections (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; 
Pylyshyn, 1999).  The visual ventral pathway, which governs shape processing and object 
recognition, is also often characterized as following this feed-forward process.  Low-level 
cortical regions in the occipital lobe (i.e., V1-4) analyze simple object attributes and this 
information is fed forward to higher-level visual areas that integrate stimulus features into 
more complex shapes (Tanaka, 1996) and represent category information (Bracci & Op 
de Beeck, 2016).  The ventral visual hierarchy concludes in the inferotemporal cortex 
(IT), where cells have large receptive fields and respond to complex features.  This neural 
model suggests that object recognition and categorization cannot be achieved until the 
visual system has completely processed the input, upon which the input is finally 
matched with an object representation in stored memory, and meaning is extracted from 
the visual percept (i.e., categorization).  Therefore, the hierarchical framework posits that 
perceptual mechanisms and internally generated signals, which evaluate the behavioral 
relevance of an input with respect to one’s goals and expectations, are functionally and 
temporally separable.   
Recent findings examining the neuroanatomical and functional properties of the 
ventral pathway challenge the traditional framework.  Kravitz and colleagues (2013) 
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demonstrated that visual information is processed along multiple channels within an 
interactive and recurrent network, clearly linking early visual areas with anterior inferior 
temporal cortex.  This framework explains a number of factors that impact object 
processing, such as attention and task context, and raises questions about how and when 
top-down signals modulate the construction of early representations of the visual world.  
The predictive coding theory (Clark, 2013) posits that sensory processes like vision are 
supported by top-down signals tuned to match incoming information from the outside 
with internal expectations and predictions.  For example, it is advantageous to anticipate 
where a moving object is headed before it gets there.  This added foresight provides 
beneficial information to the visual system, especially if it can aid in generating richer 
and more accurate representations.  Thus, if the ultimate goal of perception is to build 
rich representations in order to understand one’s surroundings, it is beneficial for 
perceptual systems to be permeable to cognitive factors, especially when prediction can 
inform the visual system (Lupyan, 2015).  The question remains open as to precisely how 
and when this kind of predictive information interacts with incoming, moment-to-
moment operations of the perceptual system.  If perceptual mechanisms are part of 
recurrent networks within an interactive cortical system, as suggested by Kravitz and 
colleagues (2013), the extent to which these processes are temporally separated remains 
uncertain. 
Recent empirical evidence has demonstrated that visual perception and 
categorization are closely linked, challenging the traditional, feed-forward view of visual 
cognition (Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004).  The following studies suggest that top-down 
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processes interact with early visual perception to yield behaviorally informed percepts 
(Schyns & Oliva, 1999; Goffaux, Jemel, Jacques, Rossion, & Schyns, 2003).  
The case for cognitive penetrability. Schyns & Oliva (1997; 1999) 
demonstrated that the act of categorization can flexibly alter the early perception of a 
stimulus.  Using hybrid stimuli, which combined high (fine) and low (course) frequency 
information into a single image, they examined whether a categorization task (e.g., 
determine the gender of the face; identify the facial expression) would change the spatial 
scale preferred for making rapid perceptual judgments.  The visual system simultaneously 
processes input through multiple spatial frequency channels, and spatial scales support 
many low-level visual processes, including motion perception (Morgan, 1920), edge 
detection (Marr & Hildreth, 1980), and depth perception (Marshall, Burbeck, Ariely, 
Rolland, & Martin, 1996).  Therefore, spatial scales are effective means for examining 
the influence of higher-order processes on lower-level visual perception.  In this study, 
the participants performed different kinds of categorical judgments (e.g., male vs. female; 
angry vs. neutral) based on their perceptual interpretation of the stimulus.  In one 
example, the stimulus contained high spatial frequency content of a woman with a neutral 
face and low spatial frequency content of a man with angry face (refer to appendix A).  
Results from these studies demonstrated that participants’ immediate perceptual 
experience of the hybrid stimuli changed as a function of the categorization task they 
performed.  And, importantly, almost all of the participants reported that they did not 
perceive the content in the other spatial scale.  Therefore, the diagnostic information of 
the stimulus afforded flexible visual categorizations, in which perceptual and cognitive 
processes were intertwined (Schyns, 1998).  That is, rapid categorization was made 
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possible by visual processes being biased to favor low-level features that were diagnostic 
of the relevant feature.  These data indicate that task demands affect the spatial scale used 
for making rapid perceptual judgments and suggest that top-down influences can interact 
with early visual processing.  
The diagnostic information used for categorizing objects can also depend on 
contextual factors.  Using a speeded same/different task, Lupyan and colleagues (2010) 
presented alphabetical letter pairs and asked participants to indicate whether they were 
physically identical (bb) or different (bB).  They found participants were significantly 
slower to judge two letters as being physically different when they were from the same 
conceptual category (bB) than from different categories (bP).  These data showed that 
conceptual information (i.e., the categorical relationship of the letters) influenced 
participant’s response times, suggesting that low-level visual processing was modulated 
by higher-level conceptual representations, resulting in context and task-dependent 
activity (see also Bar et al., 2006; Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007).   
The behavioral findings discussed above align with the interactive model of the 
ventral visual stream proposed by Kravitz and colleagues (2013), which suggest that top 
down influences impact visual processing.  In contrast to the feed forward framework, 
neurons in the visual processing stream act as adaptive processors and change their 
functional properties according to the behavioral context (as reviewed in Gilbert & Li, 
2013).  Bar (2003) proposed a top-down facilitation mechanism that rapidly projects 
partially analyzed object information from early visual areas to the prefrontal cortex 
where these partial representations activate relevant expectations.  This information is fed 
back to the visual processing stream where it combines with bottom-up, sensory input, 
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which reduces the amount of information that needs to be considered in order to make 
fast and flexible object distinctions.  Thus, the visual system is comprised of a complex 
network of bottom-up and re-entrant connections stemming from higher-order cognitive 
processes.   
Recent human neuroimaging studies have examined the effects of behavioral 
goals and attention on object representations within early visual areas (Huk & Heeger, 
2000; Harel et al., 2014, Erez & Duncan, 2015; Kay & Yeatman, 2017).  These studies 
suggest that task context impacts object representations in visual regions, either affecting 
the strength (Kay & Yeatman, 2017) or the nature of the representation (Nastase et al., 
2017).  Harel and colleagues (2014) presented a variety of real-world objects, requiring 
participants to make physical (i.e., color) and conceptual (i.e., naturalness) judgements.  
Importantly, the same objects were presented under both task conditions, which allowed 
them to examine if and how context modulated neural representations for the same visual 
input.  Their findings revealed that object representations changed as a function of the 
task context, particularly in the ventral visual pathway and prefrontal cortex, but not in 
early visual areas.  Task-dependent representations suggest that the object’s physical 
information is being combined with the internal state (e.g., goals, intent) of the observer.  
The objective of the current study was to uncover the putative impact of task on object 
recognition by determining how and when task impacted the extraction of informative 
visual features of the object.  To investigate when task effects emerge during visual 
processing, we leveraged EEG due to its fine temporal resolution. 
Temporal Dynamics of Object Processing  
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The primary limitation of behavioral studies that use reaction times to index 
cognitive processes is their inability to dissociate perceptual and higher-level processes 
from motor responses.  Aggregate measures like reaction times accumulate multiple 
processes (i.e., perception, cognition, motor response) into one summed action, which 
make it problematic to attribute variation in reaction times to specific processes within 
the information processing chain (Luce, 1986).  For example, we cannot entirely discern 
whether the delayed reaction times that Lupyan et al., (2010) observed were caused by 
perceptual delays during perceptual encoding or simply delays in motor response.  One 
way to compliment behavioral measures is by using psychophysiological measures (e.g., 
EEG, MEG) to implicitly index specific cognitive and/or behavioral processes (Luck, 
2014). 
Early visual components.  EEG and MEG provide excellent temporal resolution 
necessary for analyzing the time-course and flow of information processing in the human 
brain without relying on behavioral measures (Luck, 2014).  Event Related Potentials 
(ERP) are scalp-recorded voltage changes that index specific sensory, cognitive, and/or 
motor events (i.e., neurophysiological processes) that are elicited by auditory and visual 
stimuli.  Thus, we can utilize ERPs as proxies to inform us about early visual perceptual 
processes and whether they are susceptible to cognitive factors, as suggested by Schyns 
& Oliva (1997, 1999).  The P1, N1, and P2 components are prominent exogenous, 
sensory-driven components elicited in the presence of a visual stimulus.   
Research examining the P1, which occurs approximately 100ms poststimulus 
onset and is typically largest over the posterior lateral electrode sites, show sensitivity to 
low-level physical properties of the stimulus, such as luminance, shape, and color, as well 
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as selective attention (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998).  While top-down factors, such as 
task context do not appear to consistently affect the amplitude or latency of the P1 
(VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001; Luck, 2014), spatial attention has been shown to modulate 
the P1 and the N1 (Luck, Heinze, Mangun, & Hillyard, 1990).   
The N1, a negative voltage change occurring approximately 150-200ms 
poststimulus onset, has been widely used to understand the temporal dynamics of face 
processing.  This component, more specifically known as the N170, is reliably larger over 
lateral occipital electrode sites (especially in the right hemisphere) when participants 
view faces compared to non-face stimuli (Bentin & Deouell, 2000).  To understand 
whether the N170 is a valid index of face selective processing as opposed to being 
sensitive to low-level properties that may be more present in faces, Bentin and Golland 
(2002) examined the N170 effect for faces vs. simple stimuli (i.e., dot arrays that were 
not normally perceived as faces).  As expected, only faces elicited a larger N170.  
However, when participants were primed to interpret the simple stimuli as faces (i.e., 
participants were presented images of faces before they viewed the stimuli, which primed 
them to perceive the dots as face-like), these stimuli also elicited a larger N170.  These 
findings provide two critical insights.  First, the visual system was able to differentiate 
important information (i.e., the presence of a face) at a relatively early stage of 
processing, just 170ms after the stimulus is presented.  Second, and more relevant to the 
purview of this study, face processing was penetrable by top-down priming.  As early as 
170ms poststimulus onset, the impact of priming effects on face perception was 
observable, which suggests that cognitive processes, such as attentional mechanisms, can 
modify early visual perceptual processes. 
 
 11 
The N1 has also been used to examine the influences of task on perceptual 
processing of faces.  Goffaux and colleagues (2003) showed that the N1 amplitude was 
greater when participants were tasked with identifying the gender of a face vs. indicating 
whether the face was familiar or not.  Most critically, they only observed this effect when 
the faces were presented in the low-spatial frequency mode (vs. high-spatial frequency or 
full-spectrum modes), which suggested that the spatial frequency information was 
differentially encoded as a function of the task demands.  This work demonstrated that 
the N1 response to faces was dependent on the task under which the faces were 
presented. 
The P2 component, a positive voltage deflection occurring approximately 200ms 
poststimulus onset, is thought to index decision-related process, such as categorization.  
While less is known about the P2, it has been shown to resemble the P300 – producing 
larger amplitudes when objects contain target features that are diagnostically relevant, 
especially when they occur infrequently over time (i.e., oddballs; Luck & Hillyard, 
1994).  This suggests decision-related processes take place within the first 200ms 
poststimulus onset, challenging the notion that categorization is a post-perceptual process 
occurring later in the ventral stream.  
VanRullen and Thorpe (2001) proposed two distinct early visual processing 
stages: a perceptual stage occurring within the first 100ms poststimulus onset that is 
impervious to top-down influence, and a secondary stage (200ms onward) that is 
correlated with the participant’s behavioral goals/intentions.  They examined how early 
visual activity changed as participants categorized everyday objects when they were 
targets vs. non-targets.  The advantage of this paradigm was that identical stimuli were 
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presented under two distinct task conditions, allowing them to examine the influence of 
higher-level properties independent of low-level differences.  Prior to 150ms after the 
visual stimulus was presented, they found task-independent effects that reflected the low-
level properties of the stimuli, suggesting early visual processes were not modulated by 
whether the stimulus was a target or not.  However, during later visual processing stages, 
150-200ms poststimulus onset, they found task dependent modulations when comparing 
identical visual stimuli under the target and non-target conditions.  While little is known 
about how task context impacts object representations around this relatively early time in 
visual processing, recent MEG work by Hebart and colleagues (2018) examining how 
behavioral goals (i.e., task context) modify object representations reinforced the notion 
that task effects occur in relatively later processing stages.  
Current Study 
Using a similar approach as detailed by Harel and colleagues (2014), we designed 
an experimental paradigm that simultaneously and independently manipulated both task 
and object information on a trial-by-trial basis to examine the influence of task on visual 
object processing.  The advantage of this design was that it presented the same object 
stimuli under multiple task conditions, so we could investigate the influence of high-
level, cognitive factors independent of low-level visual properties of the stimuli.  By 
leveraging the advantages of EEG and, specifically, the ERP technique, we examined the 
temporal dynamics of visual object processing, with particular interest in whether task 
modulated early visual responses (i.e., P1, N1, P2).  We used the early visual components 
described above to investigate if and when behavioral goals, as modulated by task, 
influenced incoming visual information to facilitate object recognition and categorization.  
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This paradigm allowed us to examine whether early visual ERP responses to object 
information were task-dependent and identify if/when the task modulated perceptual 
processing of object information. 
We randomly presented four object categories (inanimate: roller-skate, 
motorbike; animate: cow, butterfly) under four task conditions (conceptual: naturalness, 
size; physical: color, tilt) throughout the course of an experimental session.  The object 
stimuli spanned two conceptual dimensions: (i) naturalness/animacy; is the object 
manmade or natural? (ii) real-world size: is the object larger or smaller than a 
conventional oven?  Additionally, we systematically manipulated objects to vary in their 
physical appearance: slightly tilted from their principal axis to the right or to the left, and 
either containing a blue or a red outline.  The four combinations of the two physical 
dimensions were equally distributed across the stimuli, so that each object category 
contained an even number of each one of the physical attributes (e.g., red/blue outline, 
left/right tilt).  These four dimensions formed the basis for the four tasks we used in the 
experiment: (i) Color: is the outline of the object colored red or blue? (ii) Tilt: is the 
object tilted left or right? (iii) Naturalness: is the object natural or manmade? (iv) Size: is 
the object conceptually large or small (e.g., can it fit inside a conventional oven)?   
The four task conditions can be grouped into two superordinate categories: 
conceptual and physical tasks.  The conceptual tasks required participants to judge the 
object based on higher-order mental concepts, such as naturalness and real-world size.  
The physical tasks required the participants to judge the perceptual qualities of the object, 
such as its outline color or tilt.  Similarly, the four object categories can be grouped into 
two superordinate categories: natural/animate (cow, butterfly) and manmade/inanimate 
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(motorbike, roller-skate).  Importantly, each object category was equally represented 
under each task condition, which allowed us to investigate how the representations of the 
same set of stimuli varied under the different tasks.  This design, implemented with the 
ERP technique examining the time window immediately following the stimulus onset, 
allowed us to examine whether task differentially impacted the amplitude and latency of 
early visual components (P1, N1, and P2), across posterior lateral electrode sites in 
response to the target object.  
Task by object interaction.  According to the interactive view of visual object 
processing presented above, we hypothesized that early visual ERPs for identical object 
stimuli would be flexibly modulated by the task.  If task can flexibly alter the early 
perceptual processing of object information, we would predict that early visual ERP 
responses to the same object would be different across the different task conditions.  We 
can measure the impact of task on the early visual responses to the stimulus by 
conducting a peak component analysis and comparing responses for each stimulus (cow, 
butterfly, motorbike, roller-skate) across all four tasks (naturalness, size, color, tilt).  Any 
amplitude and latency differences we observe in the early visual ERP components should 
be attributed to the task being performed on the stimulus and not low-level visual 
properties because the same stimulus was presented under each task condition.  
Controlling for low level differences is crucial, because changes we observe in early 
visual responses to the object across tasks will be the result of behavioral goals imposed 
by the task rather than low-level stimulus properties.  Importantly, this hypothesis does 
not specify directionality because these effects are not widely understood.  
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Task effects.  Harel and colleagues (2014) demonstrated that task modulated 
object representations throughout ventral temporal and prefrontal cortices, including the 
lateral object area.  Thus, task demands (i.e., behavioral goals) affect the quality of object 
representations throughout the cortex, but the temporal dynamics of such effects are 
uncertain.  If the participant’s perceptual experience changes as a function of the task 
demanded for categorization as suggested by Schyns and Oliva (1999) and Lupyan 
(2015), we should observe a task effect that is independent of object category on early 
visual ERPs.  Such task effects would likely index early attentional differences imposed 
by the task demands (e.g., differences in task difficulty) and not attentional engagement, 
which is observed in later processing stages, as indexed by the P3 (Polich, 2003). Again, 
this hypothesis does not specify directionality because these effects are not widely 
understood.   
Object category effects.  We compared the early visual responses to the stimulus 
categories in a task-independent manner by conducting a peak component analysis and 
averaging responses for each stimulus (cow, butterfly, motorbike, roller-skate) across all 
four tasks (naturalness, size, color, tilt), and then comparing these waveforms to one 
another.  Any differences found can be attributed to the visual properties of the stimulus 
and not the task being performed.  The stimuli were uniformly presented in monochrome 
and at the same relative visual angle, but there were physical and semantic differences in 
visual/shape properties implicit to the object categories.  For example, inanimate objects 
such as motorbikes and roller-skates contained more edges and were generally more 
rectilinear than the animate objects (e.g., cows, butterflies), which were more rounded 
and typically contain object-part relationships, such as head, body, and legs (Konkle & 
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Caramazza, 2013).  The P1 is especially sensitive to variation in stimulus parameters, 
such as object shape and the presence of edges (Luck, 2014).  N1 has been shown to 
reflect higher level categorization, such as face processing, which may also drive 
differential responses to the object categories (Bentin & Golland, 2002), including 
conceptual/semantic properties such as animacy and size (Konkle & Caramazza, 2013).  
One possibility is that animate objects elicit more negative responses compared to 
inanimate objects because they contain faces.  Taken together, we hypothesized that 
object category will produce amplitude and/or latency differences across the early visual 
components.   
Task relevance effects.  In addition to the focus on specific ERPs, we also used a 
data-driven approach to examine when and where task relevance was encoded during 
object processing.  The P3, a positive-going peak observed across midline electrodes 
occurring between 300-600ms post stimulus onset, is widely used to examine the 
temporal dynamics of information processing and can be used to determine how and to 
which task attention is being deployed.  A robust and consistent finding in the ERP 
literature is a pronounced P3 when discriminating a target amongst non-targets in an 
oddball task.  One prominent account of the P3, the context updating hypothesis, states 
that the P3 indexes the mental processes involved in updating one’s mental representation 
with respect to behavioral goals (Donchin, 1981).  When a stimulus is presented, 
attentional resources are used to evaluate and compare that representation with previous 
instances (i.e., context) stored in working memory.  When new stimulus attributes are 
detected, such as a target stimulus appearing, one’s current mental model or schema is 
updated producing a P3.  
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The P3 also indexes resource allocation as evidenced by dual task paradigms, 
which consist of simultaneously completing a primary cognitive task and a secondary 
task, such as counting the number of targets occurring amongst distractors.  When the 
primary task is cognitively taxing, the P3 amplitude is reduced when detecting an oddball 
because more attentional resources are being allocated to the primary task (Kramer, et al., 
1985).  Thus, the P3 can index the extent to which attentional resources are being 
allocated to a given task.  A number of additional variables interact to determine the P3 
amplitude (for a review, see Polich, 2011), including task difficulty and task relevance 
(i.e., how relevant the stimulus is with respect to one’s goals).  For instance, P3 amplitude 
indexes the probability of a stimulus containing a task relevant attribute.  Thus, top-down 
factors, such as categorization structure, goals, or context influence P3 as they determine 
the relevant dimensions of the object (Luck & Hillyard, 1994).  
To examine when and where task relevance modulated object processing, we 
broadened our investigation in both time and space.  We distinguish here between the 
effect of task and task relevance, the latter pertinent primarily to the conceptual tasks.  
Our experimental paradigm allowed us to examine when objects were categorized with 
respect to their task relevant category vs. their task irrelevant category.  Since we 
designed each object stimulus to contain multiple conceptual attributes (e.g., a cow is 
natural and large), this allowed us to compare the P3 responses for the same objects but 
under both levels of task relevance (relevant vs. irrelevant). We recorded neural activity 
within two time windows: early visual (0 - 300ms) and post-perceptual (300 - 600ms), at 
two electrode sites: occipital (Oz) and a central (Cz). 
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Trials began with the task descriptor followed by the object stimulus presentation.  
The task indicated the relevant diagnostic features of the object required for making the 
correct categorical judgment.  For example, if the “Size” task was followed by an image 
of a cow, the participant must first encode the image and rely on their conceptual 
knowledge to determine that cows are large objects.  Using this approach, we measured 
the differential P3 amplitude when viewing the animate objects (cow & butterfly) vs. the 
inanimate objects (roller skate & motorbike) under the relevant task (animacy; asking the 
participant to indicate whether the object is animate or inanimate), and the irrelevant task 
– size.  Importantly, the objects under both task-relevance conditions were identical, it is 
just the task relevant feature(s) (i.e., diagnostic information) that changed.  Similarly, we 
also compared the differential P3 activity for the same objects but under the alternate task 
relevant conditions; we measured large objects (cow & motorbike) vs. small objects 
(butterfly & roller-skate) under the relevant task of size and the irrelevant animacy task.  
We predict that the differential P3 activity to be greater when the objects are viewed 
under their task relevant context compared to the task irrelevant context irrespective of 
the specific task context.  
Using the same approach, we also examined the effect of task relevance on early 
visual activity (up to 300ms post-stimulus onset).  Contrasting the effect of task relevance 
between an early and later time window, and across posterior and midline electrodes sites 
can reveal the temporal dynamics underlying the evaluation of task relevance in visual 
object processing.  We compared the two object category effects discussed above 
(animacy and size) in relevant and irrelevant conditions within the early visual processing 
time window (0-300ms) and later cognitive processing time window (300-600ms) for 
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both early (Oz) and late (Cz) electrode sites.  This allowed us to study how early the 
interaction between task relevance and object category information was maintained along 
the visual processing hierarchy in both time and space, leading to the following 
hypotheses.  
At least two potential outcomes were conjectured.  If the effect of task relevance 
is relegated to cognitive, post-perceptual stages we would expect an effect of task 
relevance primarily in the P3 time window (specific to the central site).  Alternatively, an 
interaction between task relevance and object processing at perceptual processing stages 








Using an a priori power analysis, we determined a target sample of N = 30 was 
appropriate to attain a small to medium effect size (f = .15), as reported in Goffaux et al., 
2003. We recruited 38 participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision to 
participate in the experiment for course credit or monetary compensation ($30). Eight 
participants were removed for poor behavioral performance (< 85% accuracy) and/or 
extensive EEG artifacts (e.g., excessive blinking, motion).  The final sample used in the 
study consisted of 12 males and 18 females (N = 30), with a mean age of  22.6 (SD = 
4.71) All participants were recruited from a university sample, which included students, 
faculty, and staff.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and 
no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders.  Consenting participants provided 
their written informed consent, which, in addition to the experimental protocol, was 
approved by the Wright State University Institutional Review Board (IRB).  They also 
completed a brief demographics questionnaire, inquiring about handedness, age, and 
gender. 
Stimuli 
In total, 40 images of real-world objects spanning four basic categories (i.e., cow, 
butterfly, motorbike, and roller-skate) comprised the stimulus set used in this experiment.  
These images were also used in previous neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies 
(Harel et al., 2014; Hebart, Bankson, Harel, Baker, & Cichy, 2018, respectively).  Each 
object category contained ten unique exemplars and each exemplar had four 
manipulations/versions.  Because two of the task conditions involved perceptual 
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judgments, each exemplar had four variations to account for the possible combinations of 
the two physical dimensions (e.g., red +45º cow; red -45º cow; blue +45º cow; blue -45º 
cow).  These exemplar variations were equally distributed across the stimuli, so that each 
object category contained an even number of each of the physical attributes.  Appendix B 
provides multiple exemplars from each object category.  In sum, each exemplar was 
presented under each task condition comprising of 640 unique trials.  All images were 
converted to gray scale, resized to 410x410 pixels, and presented at the center of a screen, 
subtending on average 5.66° of visual angle, at a viewing distance of approximately 110 
cm (see Appendix B for additional visual angle information for each respective object) .  
We presented the visual stimuli and recorded participant responses using Presentation 
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc, Berkely, CA, www.neurobs.com) 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Participants sat in an isolated room at approximately 50 inches from a computer 
monitor piloted from a PC computer in an adjacent room.  They viewed a variety of 
object images and made simple judgments of different attributes of the target object: the 
color of their outline, their orientation, real-world size, and if they were manmade or 
natural.  The participants were asked to keep their gaze fixated on a white fixation cross 
located in the center of the screen to reduce eye motion and to prevent overtly attending 
to specific object features.  The four tasks spanned two distinct types of task 
requirements: the first two tasks require judgment of the physical attributes of the object 
(i.e., color, tilt), and the latter two require judgment of their conceptual properties (i.e., 
naturalness, size).  To instruct participants which attribute was relevant for the specific 
task, at the outset of each trial an instruction screen with the label of the task was 
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displayed prior to the presentation of the image (i.e. naturalness, size, color, tilt).  
Proceeding the stimulus presentation, two response options which corresponded to the 
task condition were laterally displayed flanking the centrally located fixation cross (i.e., 
manmade/natural, large/small, red/blue, left/right).  The response mapping was equally 
counterbalanced for each task condition.  Participants indicated their responses via left or 
right mouse button press.  In total, the participants viewed 160 unique stimuli four times 
across 16 blocks, each block containing 40 trials.  The stimuli and task conditions were 
pseudo-randomized so that each unique object stimulus was presented under each task 
condition over the course of the experiment.  
A trial was organized as follows (see Appendix C for experimental event 
sequence diagram): a white fixation cross (smaller than 1º visual angle) was presented in 
the center of the screen between trials for 500ms (inter-trial interval; ITI).  Next, the task 
cue (i.e., color, tilt, naturalness, or size) was presented in the center of the screen for 
750ms followed by the fixation cross, which reappeared during a jittered inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI) ranging from 1,000 to 1,500ms.  Lastly, the target object appeared in the 
middle of the screen for 400ms proceeded by two response options that appear on the 
screen.  The trial terminated when the participant responded via left/right mouse press or 
2,000ms elapsed (whichever came first).  Participants were instructed to keep their eyes 
open during the trial duration.  If/when they had to blink, they were reminded to blink 
during the ITIs to prevent artifacts in the ERP analysis.  The experimental session lasted 




 We used a 64 Ag-AgCl pin-type active electrode system (Biosemi ActiveTwo, 
Amsterdam) mounted on an elastic cap to record the EEG analog signals.  External 
electrodes were placed at the right and left mastoids, tip of the nose, and two EOG 
electrodes; one pair attached to the external canthi, and the other attached to the 
infraorbital and supraorbital regions of the right eye, which were used to monitor eye 
movements and blinks.  We used the Common Mode Signal (CMS), which was placed 
between P03 and P04, to reference all electrodes.  The EEG and reference electrodes 
were sampled at 512 Hz.  
Data Processing and EEG Analysis 
We processed the data using Brain Vision Analyzer 2 (Brain Products GmbH, 
Munich, Germany), which included applying a .5 Hz high-pass filter and referencing to 
the tip of the nose.  We used ocular correction ICA procedures to correct for eye 
movements and blinks (for details see Jung et al., 1998).  We rejected any remaining 
artifacts that exceeded ± 100 mV in amplitude or contained an absolute change of over 
100 mV in a period of 50ms.  Next, we segmented the preprocessed data into epochs 
ranging from − 200ms before to 800ms after stimulus onset for all conditions.  We 
rejected trials containing EEG artifacts, and no more than 20% of trials were rejected 
within any of the sixteen task-by-object pairs for any individual participant. We adopted 
the .05 level to ascertain statistical significance, and when appropriate we adjusted p-
values using the Greenhouse- Geisser epsilon correction for nonsphericity. 
 ERPs. We extracted peak information for the P1, N1, and P2 across each 
experimental condition for every participant.  The P1 was defined as the most positive 
peak between 80 and 130ms, the N1 was defined as the most negative peak between 130 
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and 200ms, and P2 was defined as the most positive peak between 170-250ms.  We 
restricted our analysis to the posterior lateral electrode sites (averaged across P7, P5, P9, 
P07 for the left hemisphere and across P8, P6, P10, P08 for the right hemisphere) because 
these regions maximally capture visual categorical activity.  We selected these early ERP 
components a priori because they are easily isolated and because of our interest in 
determining when task modulated perceptual encoding during early visual stages of 
processing.  This also reduced the likelihood of ambiguous ERP interpretations (Luck, 
2015).   
We conducted a three-way repeated measures omnibus ANOVA with hemisphere 
(right, left), task (naturalness, size, color, tilt), and object (cow, butterfly, motorbike, 
roller-skate) for both the peak amplitude and latency to agnostically examine whether 
early visual ERPs were flexibly modulated by task context.  
Our second set of analyses collapsed the individual task and object dimensions 
into their respective higher-level task and object categories.  Namely, the four tasks 
comprised two superordinate task types (physical and conceptual) and the objects were a 
combination of two additional factors; representing the crossing of two conceptual 
stimulus dimensions: animacy and size.  The purpose of this was to examine higher level 
processing that may be responsive to the higher order stimulus dimensions, animacy and 
size.  We averaged across these dimensions and conducted an additional four-way 
repeated measures omnibus ANVOA using hemisphere (right, left), task type (physical, 
conceptual), animacy (animate, inanimate), and size (small, large) for both the peak 
amplitude and latency of early visual ERPs.  
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Area under the curve.  Unlike the early visual components, the P3 is protracted 
in time and necessitates an area under the curve (AUC) measurement.  Using a secondary 
approach, we measured the impact of task relevance on object processing over an 
extended epoch of time rather than on an isolated peak.  We generated four difference 
waves across two sites (Oz and Cz) comparing the conceptual object dimensions 
(animacy and size) within the possible relevant/irrelevant task conditions (naturalness and 
size).  Measuring the differential activity reduced individual contributions (i.e., peaks) 
from each waveform, and the AUC measurement provided a more holistic index of the 
underlying neural processes, particularly the overall magnitude (Kappenman & Luck, 
2011).  The difference between animate (cows and butterflies) and inanimate objects 
(motorbikes and roller-skates) under the naturalness task was labeled task relevant.  
Similarly, the difference between the large (cows and motorbikes) and small (butterflies 
and roller-skates) under the size task was also labeled task relevant.  We compared the 
sets of objects under the alternative conceptual task to generate the task irrelevant 
difference waves.  Next, we computed the rectified AUC for each difference wave for 
two distinct time epochs: 0 – 300ms (early), and 300 – 600ms (late, P3), which we used 
in our analyses.  To examine the effect of task relevance we conducted a four-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the differential AUC for two electrode sites (Oz, Cz) 
across two periods of time (early, late).  We treated Site, Task (animacy, size), Task 
Relevance (relevant, irrelevant), and Time (early, late) as factors of the model. 
Behavior.  Each trial concluded with a behavioral judgment (left/right mouse 
click), in which the participant made a categorical judgment based on the task cue and 
object.  Their response options were dependent on the task cue and were counterbalanced 
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across trials.  We measured their accuracy in correctly choosing the correct label as well 
as their reaction time (RT).  Only the correct responses were included in the RT analyses.  
Outliers, as defined by +/- two standard deviations from the participant’s grand RT mean, 
were replaced with the participant’s grand RT mean.  We conducted a repeated measures 
omnibus ANOVA with Task and Object as factors of interest and used accuracy and RTs 
as separate dependent measures. We also examined if the preceding trial, specifically 
whether it was the same or different from the current trial, impacted RT. We added the 
“Previous Trial” factor to the aforementioned model: Task x Object x Previous Trial.  
Following the ERP collapsed analyses, we also conducted a separate three-way repeated 
measures omnibus ANOVAs with Task, Animacy, and Size as factors of interest and 





To test whether behavioral goals, as modulated by task, flexibly influenced early 
perceptual processing of objects, we first examined the interaction between task (4) and 
object (4) on early visual ERP components.  Figure 1 illustrates the averaged EEG 
waveforms for each object category under each task condition.  We did not observe 
significant task by object interactions across the early visual components (P1, N1, P2).  
 We next examined how the amplitude for each component was modulated by 
hemisphere (2), task (4), and object (4) independently (see figures 2-3), and their 
potential interactions.  The amplitude results are reported below.  For a complete review 
of the amplitude and latency analyses for each ERP component, please refer to the 
ANOVA tables in Appendix D.  
Effects of Individual Tasks on Individual Objects 
P1 component.  We observed a significant main effect of Hemisphere on the 
amplitude of the P1 component, F(1,29) = 9.84, p < .01, ηp2 = .25, in which the right 
hemisphere generated a larger peak amplitude (M = 7.73, SE = .75) compared to the left 
hemisphere (M = 6.23, SE = .67).  Secondly, there was a significant main effect of Object 
type on the amplitude of the P1 component, F(3,87) = 7.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .21 (see 
figure 4).  Post hoc tests1 revealed that the smaller objects, butterflies (M = 7.48, SE = 
.73) and roller-skates (M = 7.34, SE = .75) produced greater P1 amplitudes than cows (M 
= 6.2, SE = .56), p < .001 and p = .01, respectively. 
N1 component.  There was a significant Hemisphere-by-Object interaction on the 
amplitude of the N1 component, F(3,87) = 11.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .28.  In general, the right 
 
1  All reported post hoc tests were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons 
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hemisphere produced more negative N1 amplitudes than the left hemisphere, and both 
hemispheres showed similar responses patterns: cows and butterflies (animate objects) 
produced a greater amplitude compared to motorbikes and cows (inanimate objects).  
Next, we split hemisphere and conducted the omnibus one-way ANOVA on both 
hemispheres independently using Object as the factor of interest.  In the left hemisphere, 
there was a main effect of Object F(3,87) = 5.76, p  = .001, ηp2 = .17.  Post hoc testing 
showed that butterflies (M = -3.47, SE = .96) produced a significantly greater N1 
amplitude than roller-skates (M = -1.78, SE = 1.06), p = .001.  Similarly, the right 
hemisphere yielded a significant main effect of object F(3,87) = 22.93, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.44, in which cows (M = -3.16 , SE = 1.08) and butterflies (M = -4.41, SE = 1.04) 
generated significantly larger N1 amplitudes than roller-skates (M = -1.16, SE = 1.17), p 
< .001 and p < .001, respectively.  Additionally, butterflies produced a larger N1 
component than motorbikes (M = -2, SE = 1.22), p < .001.  
Figure 4 illustrates the significant main effect of Object type on the amplitude of 
the N1 component, F(3,87) = 14.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 34.  As discussed above, this effect 
was largely driven by the roller-skate category (M = -1.47, SE = 1.09), which produced 
significantly weaker N1 amplitudes than the other object categories: motorbike (M = -
2.31, SE = 1.13; p = .02), butterfly (M = -3.94, SE = .98; p < .001), and cow (M = -3.01, 
SE = .96; p = .001).  Additional post hoc tests revealed that butterflies produced 
significantly greater N1 amplitudes compared to motorbikes, p < .01.  This pattern of 
responses suggests there was an animacy distinction, in which animate objects generated 
greater N1 amplitudes than inanimate objects.  
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P2 component.  Similar to the P1, we observed a significant main effect of 
Hemisphere on the amplitude of the P2 component, F(1,29) = 21.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .42, 
in which the right hemisphere produced larger peak amplitudes (M = 10.14, SE = .98) 
compared to the left hemisphere (M = 7.92, SE = .81).  We also found a Hemisphere-by-
Object interaction F(3,87) = 3.95, p = .01, ηp2 = .12.  We conducted two independent 
omnibus one-way ANOVAs on both hemispheres using Object as the factor of interest.  
Both hemispheres yielded significant main effects of Object (left: F(2.29,87) = 6.33, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .18; right: F(2.34,87) = 5.87, p < .01, ηp2 = .17). In the left hemisphere, post 
hoc testing revealed that the motorbike stimuli (M = 8.74, SE = .86) produced 
significantly greater P2 peak amplitudes than all other object categories: cow (M = 7.65, 
SE = .71; p < .01), butterfly (M = 7.56, SE = .77; p < .001), and roller-skate (M = 7.73, 
SE = .94; p < .001).  The right hemisphere showed a similar pattern of responses.  The P2 
response amplitude for the two large object stimuli, cow (M = 10.32, SE = .91) and 
motorbike (M = 10.92, SE = .95) produced significantly greater P2 amplitudes compared 
to the response for butterflies (M = 9.25, SE = .95), p < .01 and p < .001, respectively. 
There was also a significant main effect of Object on the amplitude of the P2 
component, F(2.29,87) = 6.43, p = .01, ηp2 = .18 ; see figure 4).  Post hoc tests revealed 
similar effects discussed above.  The motorbikes (M = 9.83, SE = .94) produced 
significantly larger P2 amplitudes than all other object categories: cows (M = 8.98, SE = 
.77; p = .04), butterflies (M = 8.4, SE = .83; p < .001.), and roller-skates (M = 8.89, SE = 
1; p < .01).  
Effects of Task Type on Conceptual Object Dimensions: Animacy and Size 
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For the second set of analyses we averaged across the four task dimensions to 
comprise two superordinate task types (physical and conceptual), and the four objects 
into the crossing of two conceptual stimulus dimensions: animacy and size.  We designed 
this set of analyses to reveal higher order neural distinctions that may be inherent to the 
task and object properties, which are not made explicit when examining each task and 
object individually.  Using these superordinate factors, we conducted a four-way repeated 
measures omnibus ANVOA with hemisphere (right, left), General Task (physical, 
conceptual), Animacy (animate, inanimate), and Size (small, large) for both the peak 
amplitude and latency of early visual ERPs to independently test this question of higher 
order visual processing.  Please refer to the ANOVA tables in Appendix E for a full 
review of the amplitude and latency analyses for each ERP.  
P1 component.  We observed a significant main effect of Size on the amplitude 
of the P1 component, F(1,29) = 19.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .4, in which the large objects (M = 
6.56, SE = .62) generated a greater P1 amplitude than the small object categories (M = 
7.41, SE = .72; see figure 4A).  Additionally, there was a significant interaction effect 
between Hemisphere and Size on the amplitude of the P1 component, F(1,29) = 4.43, p = 
.04, ηp2 = .13.  Next, we partitioned Hemisphere and conducted the one-way omnibus 
ANOVA on both electrode pools using Size as the factor.  As indicated within the 
individual 4x4 analysis, there was a Size effect (i.e., the small objects produced a greater 
P1 amplitude than the large objects), which was significant across both respective 
hemispheres.  In the left hemisphere, small objects (M = 6.54, SE = .72) produced a 
larger P1 amplitude than large objects (M = 5.92, SE = .64), t(29) = 3.53, p = .001.  
However, this effect was more pronounced in the right hemisphere, whereby small 
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objects (M = 7.19, SE = .69) produced a larger P1 amplitude than large objects (M = 
8.28, SE = .81), t(29) = 4.2, p < .001.  
N1 component.  We observed a significant main effect of Animacy on the 
amplitude of the N1 component, F(1,29) = 27.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .49 (see figure 5), in 
which the animate objects produced larger peaks (M = -3.48, SE = .94) compared to the 
inanimate objects (M = -1.89, SE = 1.1).  Additionally, there was a Hemisphere by 
Animacy interaction F(1,29) = 25.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .47.  The animacy effect was 
present within both hemispheres: in the left hemisphere, animate objects (M = -3.16, SE 
= .91) produced a greater N1 amplitude than inanimate objects (M = -1.58, SE = 1.18), 
t(29) = -2.99, p = .006, but the animacy effect was magnified in the right hemisphere.  
Animate objects (M = -3.79, SE = 1.03) generated a larger N1 amplitude than inanimate 
objects (M = -1.58, SE = 1.18), t(29) = -6.69, p < .001. 
There was also an Animacy by Size interaction on the N1 amplitude, F(1,29) = 
13.45, p = .001, ηp2 = .32.  Animate small objects (butterflies, M = -3.94, SE = .98) 
produced a significantly larger N1 amplitude than animate large objects (cows, M = -
3.01, SE = .95), t(29) = 2.14, p = .04.  The direction of this relationship flipped in the 
inanimate category.  Large objects (motorbike, M = -2.31, SE = 1.13) produced a 
significantly larger N1 amplitude than small objects (roller-skates, M = -1.47, SE = 1.09), 
t(29) = -3. 13, p < .01.  
P2 component.  Like the N1 component, we observed a significant main effect of 
Animacy F(1,29) = 5.29, p = .03, ηp2 = .15 (see figure 5).  However, the direction of this 
effect reversed as inanimate objects (M = 9.36, SE = .96) generated a greater P2 
component compared to the animate object categories (M = 8.69, SE = .79).  There was 
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also a significant Size main effect, F(1,29) = 25.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .47.  Large objects (M 
= 9.4, SE = .84) generated a larger P2 amplitude than small objects (M = 8.65, SE = .9).  
We observed a significant three-way, Hemisphere-by-Task-by-Size interaction on 
the P2 amplitude F(1,29) = 8.03, p < .01, ηp2 = .22.  Next, we performed the 2-way 
ANOVA on each hemisphere independently using General Task and Size as factors.  
There was a significant main effect of Size in both the left hemisphere, F(1,29) = 12.55, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .3,  and right hemisphere, F(1,29) = 28.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .49.  In the left 
hemisphere, large objects (M = 8.19, SE = .77) yielded a larger P2 component than small 
objects (M = 7.64, SE = 85), t(29) = -3.54, p = .001, but this effect was most pronounced 
in the right hemisphere (large: M = 10.62, SE = .96; small: M = 9.65, SE = 1.01), t(29) = 
-5.34, p < .001.  The Task-by-Size interaction was not significant, F(1,29) = 4.51, p = 
.07. 
Hemisphere, Animacy, and Size also combined to form a significant three-way 
interaction on the amplitude of the P2 component, F(1,29) = 8.82, p < .01, ηp2 = .23.  We 
split Hemisphere and performed the 2-way ANOVA using Animacy and Size as factors 
of interest.  In the left hemisphere, we observed a main effect of Animacy, F(1,29) = 
5.33, p = .03, ηp2 = .16, in which animate objects (M = 7.6, SE = .73) generated 
significantly smaller P2 amplitude than inanimate objects (M = 8.23, SE = .89), p  =.03.  
There was also a significant main effect of Size in the left hemisphere, F(1,29) = 12.55, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .3.  Large objects (M = 8.19, SE = .77) produced a significantly larger P2 
amplitude than small objects (M = 7.64, SE = 85), p = .001.  This size effect was also 
present in the right hemisphere, F(1,29) = 28.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .49.   Large objects (M = 
10.62, SE = .96) yielded a significantly larger P2 amplitude than small objects (M = 9.65, 
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SE = 1.01), p < .001. Further, there was a significant Animacy-by Size interaction, 
F(1,29) = 6.18, p  = .04, ηp2 = .14.  Post hoc tests comparing large vs. small for both 
animate and inanimate object categories revealed that for inanimate objects, size affected 
the amplitude of the P2 component.  Specifically, inanimate large objects (i.e., 
motorbikes) produced a significantly larger P2 amplitude than inanimate small objects 
(i.e., roller-skates), t(29) = 4.10, p < .001.  
Task Relevance Results 
The tasks comprised of two task types: conceptual and physical, and the objects 
were a combination of two additional factors, representing the crossing of two conceptual 
stimulus dimensions – size and animacy.  Therefore, we partitioned task further into the 
two conceptual tasks, in which the participants were instructed to attend to animacy (i.e., 
naturalness) or real-world size of the object.  Because each object contained both size 
(small or large) and animacy (animate or inanimate) dimensions, we could examine how 
the relevance of those dimensions associated with each task (animacy or size) impacted 
underlying neural activity.  We examined the object category effects (animacy and size) 
across both task relevant and task irrelevant conditions in both time and space.  In order 
to do this, we created difference waveforms reflecting when objects were viewed under 
their task relevant context compared to the task irrelevant context (see figure 5).  
Therefore, we examined the differential activity when viewing animate objects (cow, 
butterfly) vs. the inanimate objects (motorbike, roller-skate) under the animacy task (task 
relevant) and the size task (task irrelevant).  We did the same for the other conceptual 
object dimension, examining the differential activity when viewing the large objects 
(cow, motorbike) vs. the small objects (butterfly, roller-skate) under the size task (task 
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relevant) and the animacy task (task irrelevant).  We conducted a 4-way omnibus 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the differential activity measured by area under the curve 
(AUC) for two electrode sites (Oz, Cz) across two periods of time (early, late).  We 
treated Site, Task (animacy: animate vs. inanimate objects, size: large vs. small objects), 
Task Relevance (relevant, irrelevant), and Time (early, late) as factors of the model, and 
AUC magnitude was the dependent variable. Please refer to the ANOVA tables in 
Appendix F for a complete overview of the differential activity (as measured by area 
under the curve) across the factors of interest. 
While we did not observe any main effects, we found that Task Relevance and 
Time interacted to form a significant two-way interaction, F(1,29) = 7.69, p = .01, ηp2 = 
.21.  Additionally, there was a significant four-way interaction between Site, Task, Task 
Relevance, and Time, F(1,29) = 5.17, p = .03, ηp2 = .15.  We focused on the latter 
interaction because it contained the most factors.  Next, we separated Task and conducted 
separate 3-way repeated-measures omnibus ANOVAs for both the Animacy and Size 
tasks independently, examining AUC for both Sites, using Task Relevance and Time as 
additional factors of interest.  The following sections describe the findings for each task 
independently, starting with the animacy task (i.e., perceptual processing of animate vs. 
inanimate objects).  
Animacy task.  We did not observe a main effect of Task Relevance in the 
animacy task, F(1,29) = 3.95, p = .06, ηp2 = .12  (see figure 8-9), comparing the 
differential activity for animate vs. inanimate objects when they were viewed under the 
animacy task context (M = 570.59, SE = 45.05) compared to the size task context (M = 
477.09, SE = 25.33).  However, there was a significant Site-by-Task Relevance-by-Time 
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interaction, F(1,29) = 9.75, p < .01, ηp2 = .25.  We conducted two 2-way omnibus 
ANOVAs to examine magnitude for each Site (Oz, Cz), using Task Relevance and Time 
as the factors of interest. The following effects were isolated to the animacy dimension at 
the Cz electrode site.  First, we observed a significant main effect of Task Relevance, 
F(1,29) = 5.47, p = .03, ηp2 = .16.   Differential activity was greater when objects 
(animate vs. inanimate) were viewed under their task relevant (animacy) context (M = 
592.62, SE = 51.52) compared to when they were viewed under the task irrelevant (size) 
context (M = 467.15, SE = 29.01).  Secondly, we observed a significant Task Relevance 
by Time interaction, F(1,29) = 6.26, p = .02, ηp2 = .18.  Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that in the late time window, the differential activity in the task relevant context (M = 
662.33, SE = 73.18) was significantly greater than differential activity in the task 
irrelevant context (M = 448.75, SE = 30.51, t(29) = 2.76, p = .01).  In the early time 
window, there were no such differences between task relevant (M = 522.91, SE = 46.99) 
and irrelevant (M = 485.54, SE = 37.49) differential activity.  Lastly, the differential 
activity in the task relevant context was significantly greater during the later time window 
compared to the task relevant context in the early time window, t(29) = 2.08, p = .04, but 
there were no such differences between time windows within the task irrelevant context 
(early: M = 485.54, SE = 37.49; late: M = 448.75, SE = 30.51). 
Size task.  We observed that Task Relevance and Time interacted to form a 
significant 2-way interaction for the size task, F(1,29) = 6.79, p = .01, ηp2 = .19.  Simple 
main effects analyses revealed that magnitude was greater across both electrode sites in 
the task-relevant context during the late time window (M = 617.04, SE = 47.16) vs. the 




Accuracy.  We did not observer effects of Task on participants’ accuracy, F(3, 
87) = .73, p = .53 (refer to figure 11).  Further, there were no Task by Object interactions 
on accuracy, F(9, 26) = .96, p = .48, ηp2 = .03.  However, we did observe a main effect of 
the Object type on accuracy, F(3,87) = 4.38, p < .01 , ηp2 = .13,  suggesting some objects 
were more difficult to categorize than others.  Post hoc testing revealed that cows (M = 
.96, SE = .01) and motorbikes (M = .96, SE = .01) were significantly more difficult to 
categorize than butterflies (M = .98, SE = .01), p = .02 and p < .01, respectively.  While 
these differences were statistically significant, there was not a clear relationship between 
the difficulty for certain objects to be categorized with the electrophysiological findings.  
Additionally, the primary aim of this analysis was to test for variation in difficulty across 
tasks, not object categories. Appendix G provides a full overview of ANOVA tables 
describing the behavioral (accuracy and RT) effects. 
Reaction time.  The following RT results are reported for correct trials only.  
There was a main effect of Task on RT, F(3,87) = 5.29, p < .01, ηp2 = .15.  Post hoc tests 
showed that the Size task (M = 557.35, SE = 18.41) produced significantly slower RTs 
compared to the naturalness (M = 549.25, SE = 18.78), p = .06, and tilt (M = 544.24, SE 
= 18.84) tasks p = .001.  Next, we observed a main effect of Object on RT, F(3,87) = 
8.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .24.  As a general trend, the inanimate objects produced slower 
reaction times than the animate objects (see figure 10).  Examining the specific object 
effects through post hoc testing revealed that participants were significantly slower to 
classify motorbikes (M = 560.63, SE = 16.69) than cows (M = 533.02, SE = 17.89), p = 
.03.  Also, roller-skates (M = 565.57, SE = 19.76) produced significantly slower RTs than 
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cows and butterflies (M = 542.26, SE = 19.18), p < .001 and p = .001, respectively.  
Finally, Task and Object interacted to affect RT, F(9,261) = 3.19, p = .001, ηp2 = .09.  
We conducted four separate one-way repeated measures ANOVAs to examine potential 
RT differences between the objects within each task condition. 
In the naturalness task, participants’ RTs for cows (M = 527.68, SE = 17.85) were 
significantly faster than all other object categories: butterflies (M = 549.61, SE = 20.16; p 
< .01), motorbikes (M = 560.99, SE = 17.34; p < .01), and roller-skates (M = 558.71, SE 
= 22.61; p = .014).  Within the other conceptual task, size, participants’ RTs cows (M = 
543.09, SE = 20.54) and butterflies (M = 551.06, SE = 20.46) were both faster than 
roller-skates (M = 578.27, SE = 19.42), p = .005 and p < .001, respectively.  The color 
task produced a similar animacy effect, in which the cows (M = 530.41, SE = 16.45) 
produced significantly faster RTs than the motorbikes (M = 568.36, SE = 17.73) and 
roller-skates (M = 571.58, SE = 18.7), p < .01 and p < .001, respectively.  Also, 
butterflies (M = 532.18, SE = 17.51) generated faster RTs than both inanimate objects, 
motorbikes (p < .01) and roller-skates (p < .001).  Lastly, in the tilt category, cows (M = 
530.88, SE = 18.09) produced significantly faster RTs than roller-skates (M = 553.71, SE 
= 20.47), p = .03.  These data show a general trend in which the animate objects produced 
faster RTs than the inanimate objects, and this pattern was consistent across all four tasks. 
This difference was most pronounced in the perceptual tasks, especially the color task.  
Finally, we examined whether the previous trial impacted participant’s RTs.  
Specifically, we tested whether the preceding trial (if it was the same or different from 
the current trial) impacted the participant’s RT on the current trial. We did not observe a 
main effect of Previous Trial on participant’s reaction times, F(1,29) = .87, p = .35, ηp2 = 
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.03, nor did we find that the Previous Trial interacted with Task or Object, p = .31 and p 





 Behavioral findings have suggested that cognitive factors, such as behavioral 
goals and task demands influence perceptual processing.  Lupyan (2010) demonstrated 
that conceptual information (i.e., the categorical relationship between two letters) 
influenced participant’s performance on an explicit visual task, suggesting existing 
knowledge of a conceptual category directly interacts with perceptual processing.  
Similarly, Schyns and colleagues (1998) found that task demands affect the spatial scale 
used for making rapid perceptual judgments.  While these findings suggest top-down 
influences interact with early visual processing, they fail to pinpoint the temporal locus of 
this interaction (i.e., does it occur early or late?).  The aim of this current study was to do 
just that by modulating the task under which identical objects were presented and 
measuring neural activity associated with processing the object information using EEG.  
EEG provides the high temporal resolution, which can shed light on when neural signals 
emerge and reveal how/when task influences perceptual object processing in time.  Based 
on previous behavioral and neuroimaging findings, we hypothesized that early visual 
ERPs for identical objects would be flexibly modulated by task they were presented 
under.  However, we did not find evidence to support this hypothesis.    
Using a more agnostic approach, we investigated if and when the relevance of the 
task context influenced neural activity beyond the early visual ERP peaks.  We measured 
the object category effects (animacy and size) across both task relevant and task 
irrelevant conditions in both time (0-300ms and 300-600ms) and space (Oz and Cz).  We 
found that in the naturalness task where participants attended to the animacy dimension, 
differential activity for the animate vs. inanimate objects, as measured by area under the 
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curve, was greater than small vs. large object differential activity.  Further, we observed a 
four-way interaction between Site, Task, Task Relevance, and Time.  Specifically, in the 
animacy task, the task relevance effect was greatest in the later time window (300-
600ms) at the more central site (Cz), suggesting task-related processing occurs within 
frontoparietal regions after early perceptual object processing. 
Irrespective of the interaction between task and object processing, we observed a 
number of object-specific effects on early visual ERPs, which demonstrated that 
conceptual properties of the stimulus (e.g., animacy and size) were encoded differently 
over time.  Starting as early as 100ms post stimulus onset, we found that small objects 
elicited a larger P1 amplitude than large objects, and this difference was most pronounced 
within the animate object dimension (butterfly vs. cow).  Additionally, we observed that 
the animate objects produced a larger N1 amplitude than inanimate objects, and this 
effect was driven by the roller-skate stimulus, which elicited a significantly smaller N1 
amplitude than all other object category.  Interestingly, the amplitude of the P2 
component contradicted the earlier P1 and N1 effects, whereby inanimate objects 
generated a significantly larger amplitude than animate objects, and large objects 
produced a larger amplitude than small objects.  More specifically, we observed a three-
way interaction, which showed that within the left hemisphere, inanimate large objects 
(motorbike) yielded a significantly greater P2 amplitude than inanimate small objects 
(roller-skate).   
Task by Object Interaction 
We hypothesized that we would observe an interaction between task and object 
processing on early visual ERPs.  However, we did not find evidence of the task context 
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differentially modulating early visual processing of object information.  Our lack of 
ability to establish the interaction in question was impacted by the final trial counts used 
to define the peak ERP amplitude and latencies.  Although each of the 4x4 conditions 
contained 40 trials, some trials were removed from the ERP definitions due to noise 
artifacts impacting the EEG recording.  Consequently, the final trial counts were 
relatively low (approximately 35 per condition; Luck, 2014), which reduced the statistical 
power to detect the effect.  When determining the appropriate number of experimental 
trials necessary to test a hypothesis, Boudewyn and colleagues (2018) recommend 
additional factors should be considered, including the size of the sample, the amount of 
noise/artifacts present in the recording, and the anticipated effect size.  In this study, we 
determined the number of participants to achieve a small to moderate effect size given the 
trial count at hand. Future work may potentially compensate for the relatively low trial 
count by increasing the sample size and minimizing the noise level in the EEG recording. 
In addition to the design limitations, the insensitivity of the dependent measure 
(i.e., ERP peaks/latencies) may have restricted our ability to conclusively examine and 
interpret the underlying effects of task on early visual object processing.  The participant 
viewed the task approximately 2 – 2.5 seconds before they saw the object. While task-
related processing occurred between the presentation of the task and the object, it remains 
uncertain if and how this processing impacted the early visual processing of the object.  
One possibility is that task effects were present during early visual object processing but 
were not detectable by the averaged ERP waveforms. Task effects may start small and 
cascade to larger effects that become detectable during later stages of processing. In this 
case, the p < .05 level that we used to ascertain statistical significance becomes 
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particularly important because it acts as a threshold used to detect perturbations on the 
ERP waveforms. Setting the appropriate threshold to detect such perturbations is 
important for future work to consider.  
 (Im)penetrability.  The question of cognitive (im)penetrability asks whether 
internally generated (endogenous) signals modulate early visual (exogenous) responses of 
the physical world. We designed this experiment to leverage early visual ERPs and 
examine this question, specifically looking at the interaction between task and object 
processing on exogenous responses. A theoretical explanation for the null result reported 
here may be the impenetrability of early visual processing.  The task information may not 
have modulated the extraction of visual information from the object stimuli, which was 
encoded during this relatively early stage of visual processing (0-300ms).  According to 
Pylyshyn (1998), early visual processes are immune to observer goals, such as 
expectations, task context, and existing knowledge.  While the precise location and 
temporal markers that separate early from late vision remain uncertain, Pylyshyn and 
others claim that there must be some part of visual processing that is not subject to 
cognitive influence (i.e., early vision).  Therefore, one potential explanation of our results 
is the impenetrability of early vision, which states that early visual processing (i.e., at 
least within the first 300ms of perceiving an object) is impenetrable by task information 
and observer goals.   
Recent work has demonstrated that the visual system is comprised of neurons that 
are adaptive processors, which are flexible to cognitive factors that can modify their 
functional properties (as reviewed in Gilbert & Li, 2013).  Feedforward signals that stem 
from internal goals/task context contain different information and meaning about the 
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same visual information, and this information is processed throughout the visual system 
(Gilbert & Li, 2013; Kravitz et al., 2013).  Therefore, the question is not whether neurons 
in the visual system are being modulated by top-down connections within and outside of 
the visual system.  The critical question from a neuroscientific perspective is whether 
early visual neurons actually respond to how the visual information is being interpreted 
rather than the external light input (Pylyshyn, 1999).  In the case of cognitive 
penetrability, the neurons would be driven by the observer’s internal goals and 
expectations (as modulated by the task in this experiment) yielding interpretation-specific 
perceptions and would not be driven by external visual patterns.  Our data failed to 
support this claim, as we did not observer any interactions between task and object as 
indexed by the amplitude or latency of early visual ERPs recorded from posterior lateral 
sites (visual cortex).  
Early attention.  Pylyshyn theorized that one of the ways cognitive processes 
intervene to determine the nature of vision was through attentional allocation (1998).  
Prior to early vision, existing knowledge/expectations can direct an observer’s attention 
to specific locations in space (i.e., space-based attention) and/or to certain properties (i.e., 
feature-based attention) of the stimulus.  The current study attempted to examine when 
the context of the task influenced the early visual processing of objects.  However, it was 
critical that the tasks did not present biases in early attentional processes, as they may 
present confounds in interpreting the ERP results.  Desimone and Duncan (1995) 
demonstrated that attention biases visual inputs competing for representation and further 
processing in the visual system.  They found attended inputs received priority over 
unattended inputs in neurons located in V2 of primates, which suggests these effects are 
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occurring early in the visual processing stream.  Electrophysiological studies 
investigating the locus of the P1 support prior work purporting that spatial selective 
attention modulates visual processing in the extrastriate cortex (Regan, 1989), and this 
modulation is occurring during perceptual analysis of a stimulus (Mangun, Hillyard, & 
Luck, 1993).  More recent fMRI findings have demonstrated attention-related effects in 
the primary visual cortex, challenging the premise that V1 functions as a computational 
image processor that is impervious to cognitive factors (Gandhi, Heeger, and Boynton, 
1999).  Because early attentional effects can also modulate early visual ERPs, we tried to 
control for early attentional variance in two ways.   
First, we attempted to systematize spatial attention from trial to trial by including 
a fixation cross on each trial event and instructing participants to restrict their eye 
movements to the center of screen.  While we removed trials with excessive eye 
movements and blinks from the ERP analysis, we could not control for covert attentional 
shifts sans eye movements.  The task condition could have preempted the participants to 
covertly attend to specific object features for faster and more accurate categorization.  For 
example, under the color task the participants had to indicate whether the outline of the 
object was red or blue.  Thus, it is possible that participants could have selectively 
attended (albeit covertly) to the relevant diagnostic information on the perimeter of the 
stimulus.  Selective spatial attention was treated as a confound in this study because we 
set out to examine how task information modulated perceptual processing independent of 
early attentional effects, which we know modulates visual processing by enhancing or 
biasing the neural responses during perceptual analysis (i.e., encoding). 
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 Secondly, we tried to control for early attentional variance by attempting to 
design the four tasks to be of equal difficulty.  The goal was to prevent attentional 
demands favoring tasks that were more difficult.  Despite these attempts, the behavioral 
results suggest there was variation in the difficulty across tasks and objects, as measured 
by participant’s accuracy and RTs.  
While we did not observe task effects on the participant’s ability to accurately 
categorize, we did observe RT differences.  Specifically, RTs were significantly slower in 
the size task compared to the naturalness and tilt tasks.  Further, we observed a 
significant task by object interaction.  Post hoc tests revealed that the RTs were 
significantly faster for animate objects than the inanimate objects, and while the extent of 
this relationship varied across tasks, it was largely upheld.  We did not observe any task 
by object interactions in electrophysiological data, but we found this RT pattern of 
behavior (animate objects categorized faster) to be related with N1 activity, which 
showed larger peak amplitudes for animate vs. inanimate objects.  The time course of this 
neural-behavioral correlation aligns with the second stage of visual processing proposed 
by VanRullen & Thorpe (2001), which they argue is largely task-dependent and is 
explicitly tied to behavioral judgments.  Further, the relationship indicates that by this 
particular stage of processing (approximately 170ms after stimulus onset), identification 
and categorization processes have taken place and are “accessible” to the observer (i.e., 
have entered visual awareness), which is reflected by the faster RTs.  Neuroimaging 
evidence has localized the source of such decision-related activities to category selective 
regions of cortex, such as the fusiform face area and parahippocampal place area 
(Kanwisher, 2010) in occipito-temporal cortex.  Based on the behavioral findings, it is 
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possible that the variation in neural activity we observed during this stage (> 150ms) may 
be due to the attentional demands/difficulty of the task rather than the visual input.  If this 
study were to be replicated in the future, it would be important to adjust the task demands 
so they were more equivalent as reflected by participant accuracy and RTs.   
 We also observed a main effect of the object type on the accuracy and RT of 
behavioral judgments.  Specifically, regarding accuracy, we found that large objects (cow 
and motorbike) were more difficult to categorize than the butterfly stimulus.  One 
explanation for this may be the way in which the participant’s viewed the stimulus.  The 
cow and motorbike objects were presented in a side view, which emphasized the body of 
the stimulus. The butterfly, on the other hand, was presented in a symmetric frontal view.  
The variation in viewpoint may have caused the accuracy differences we observed.  
However, these results were not pertinent to the primary objective of this study, which 
was to examine if and when task impacted visual object processing.  As such, the aim of 
the behavioral analysis was to examine whether the tasks used in this study exhibited 
variation in difficulty (as measured by accuracy and RT), not the specific object 
categories. The object-specific accuracy and RT effects were exhibited across all tasks.  
To summarize, the objective for this study was to investigate the time course and 
functional characteristics of visual object processing using EEG.  Our goal was to assess 
when visual object processing varies as a function of the task context.  We did not find 
support for the hypothesis that task information modulates early visual processing.  As 
discussed, visual information is processed along multiple channels within an interactive 
and recurrent network (Kravitz et al., 2013), and multiple brain regions contribute to the 
EEG/ERP signal which make interpreting ERP data difficult. Further, the insensitivity of 
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the dependent measured used in this study (i.e.,. ERP peaks/latencies) may have masked 
the potential interactions between task and object representations especially during early 
visual stages of processing. Finally, Pylyshyn and Fodor’s impenetrability of early vision 
is a theoretical challenge to the proposed hypothesis. To circumvent the limitations of the 
ERP method and to further examine when and how task influenced object processing, we 
turned our focus to a more agnostic approach, which examined how the relevance of the 
task context impacted object processing via differential activity across both time and 
space.  
Task Relevance Effects   
We examined how the relevance of the task context impacted object processing 
across both time and space by measuring the effects of task relevance in two time 
windows (0-300ms and 300-600ms post stimulus onset), and across two sites: a posterior 
lateral electrode site (Oz) and a more central location (Cz).  Importantly, this tested the 
interaction between task relevance and object processing during the early perceptual and 
later cognitive processing stages within occipital and central regions.  As suspected, we 
found that differential activity was greatest when objects were viewed under the task 
relevance context (e.g., viewing animate objects under the naturalness task) compared to 
the task irrelevant context (e.g., viewing animate objects under the size task).  However, 
this effect was isolated to the animacy task only.  Secondly, we found the effect of task 
relevance to be relegated to cognitive, post-perceptual stages, occurring primarily in the 
later time window and specific to the central site.  The differential activity comparing 
animate vs. inanimate objects in the task relevant context was significantly greater than 
the differential activity for this animacy effect in the task irrelevant context (i.e,. size 
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task) in the later time windows at the Cz site.  Taken together, these results may suggest 
task-related processing occurs post-perceptually (>300ms post-stimulus onset) following 
initial visual object processing and although the spatial acuity of EEG is relatively poor 
compared to MEG and fMRI, this suggests task related information (i.e., behavioral 
goals, attentional allocation) is first processed outside of early visual areas in 
frontoparietal regions.  
While the locus of task relevance effects reported in this study align with existing 
literature (VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001; Hebart et al., 2019), we cannot definitively 
conclude that task-related processing does not take place in early visual areas. The 
reported analyses failed to reject the null hypothesis within the early perceptual time 
window, but this does not logically imply the null to be true. Instead, we failed to observe 
the effects of task relevance during early time windows. These findings are consistent 
with VanRullen and Thorpe’s two-stages of visual processing (2001), in which the later 
visual stage (post 100ms) is marked by cognitive influence, which includes task related 
processing (e.g., target vs. non-target).  Further, using a similar design as the one detailed 
in this study, Hebart and colleagues (2019) demonstrated that task effects enhanced task-
relevant features of the object during later stages of processing, and they found that task 
context had little impact on object representations in occipital regions.  Taken together, 
our findings are consistent with an accruing body of literature suggesting that task related 
processing dynamically interacts with object representations (Kravitz et al, 2011; Harel et 
al, 2014; Hebart et al, 2018 ), but these interactions manifest during later processing 
stages outside of early occipital regions.  
Object Category Effects  
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 Although we failed to observe task by object interactions, we did find that various 
properties of the stimulus generated a number of ERP differences.  Neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological literature have uncovered distinct cortical regions that respond 
selectively to certain semantic categories, such as faces (fusiform face area), scenes 
(parahippocampal place area), and objects (lateral object place area; see Kanwisher, 2010 
for a full review).  However, less is known about the time course of perceptual 
categorization and the effect of non-linguistic conceptual knowledge on early visual 
ERPs.  The objects we used in this study comprised of two conceptual dimensions: 
animacy and size.   
At the earliest processing stages, approximately 100ms post stimulus onset, we 
observed a prominent size effect, in which small objects generated a larger P1 component 
relative to large objects.  Further, there was an interaction between animacy and size.  
The size difference was magnified within the animate objects, whereby the small objects 
(i.e., butterflies) yielded a greater P1 component than the large objects (i.e., cows).  This 
size difference was non-significant in the inanimate group (motorbikes, roller-skates).  
There are at least two potential explanations for these findings.  First, the P1 component 
is known to be sensitive to low-level properties (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998), such as 
luminance and spatial frequency content, which were not completely accounted for and 
could potentially explain the reported object category ERP differences.  While color, 
physical size of the images, and visual angle were controlled for, there could be variation 
in the spatial frequency content, which caused P1 variation amongst the object categories. 
Second, previous EEG work has demonstrated differential neural activity for 
varying object categories (e.g., animals vs. vehicles) starting as early as 75-110ms after 
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stimulus onset (Halgren, Raij, Marinkovic, Jousma ̈ki, & Hari, 2000; VanRullen & 
Thorpe, 2001).  The neural regions generating these early responses are likely extrastriate 
structures, which direct feature extraction, such as shape/geometry (Riesenhuber & 
Poggio, 2000).  Therefore, stimulus information is being extracted at a relatively early 
stage in the processing stream; however, it is uncertain if this neural activity is correlated 
with behavioral judgments.  Some argue that the semantic/conceptual properties of the 
stimulus that are necessary for identifying/categorizing an object (i.e., butterfly) are not 
actively encoded in extrastriate regions, but occur in upstream processing areas 
(VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001).  Thus, decision related processes are not correlated with 
early visual processing but are more associated neural responses occurring after the first 
100ms.  
The spatial organization of visuotemporal cortex is shaped by object attributes, 
such as real-world size (Konkle & Oliva, 2011) and animacy (Caramazza & Shelton, 
2009), which may underly the reported ERP differences, especially in N1 and P2.  Using 
neuroimaging, Konkle and Caramazza (2013) demonstrated that object representations 
are organized based on their real-world size and animacy (Mahon & Caramazza, 2011), 
which are reflected in coarse spatial organization across ventral temporal cortex.  These 
findings indicate that category preferences may not be dependent on visual experience, 
which define dimensions of similarity (e.g., faces, places).  Rather, the physical size of an 
object determines how one interacts with it.  Small objects can be manipulated and offer 
affordances, whereas, large objects are stationary and are often used as reference points 
for navigation.  Therefore, an objects real-world size give rise to biases in one’s visual 
experience, which determines where high-level object representations manifest in the 
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cortex.  Large and small objects produce robust differential responses, and these 
preferences are grouped spatially in a medial-to-lateral arrangement across the ventral 
surface of cortex.  This organization of object information is mirrored along the lateral 
surface, with small objects located more inferior and large objects located in more 
superior regions.  
Real world size differentially impacted the N1 response to inanimate and animate 
objects, wherein inanimate objects produced stronger responses for large inanimate 
objects vs. small inanimate objects.  The animate objects produced the opposite trend, in 
which the large objects (i.e., cows) generated greater N1 amplitudes than small objects 
(i.e., butterflies).  Existing research exploring high-level organizational principles, such 
as animacy and size, have used more comprehensive image sets, containing mammals, 
birds, and reptiles.  Our image set was quite small in comparison but yielded similar 
results despite only containing two objects within each conceptual dimension (animacy 
and size).  Further, the observed effects may have been attenuated due to the specific 
objects used in this study.  Insects are not the best representation of the animate class 
(Connolly et al., 2012), whereas neural responses to primates vs. inanimate objects 
optimally illustrate this categorical distinction.  Additionally, while motorbikes and cows 
are certainly larger than roller-skates and butterflies, they are not large enough to be used 
as navigational landmarks, which is often what distinguishes the size dimension 
discussed earlier (Konkle & Oliva, 2011).  Despite the inherent object category 
limitations in the current study, our findings may support the tripartite (animacy-size) 
organization of the ventral stream (Konkle & Caramazza, 2013), and importantly, they 
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indicate that this organizational principle can be observed in a relatively early stage along 
the visual processing hierarchy.   
Proverbio, Del Zotto, and Zani (2007) found a similar pattern of results, in which 
the occipito-temporal cortex was most responsive to animate objects compared to 
artifacts/tools as indexed by the N1 component.  Further, they demonstrated that frontal 
regions during this same time window as well as later processing stages in occipito-
temporal cortex were more responsive to artifacts/tools.  Consistent with this study, we 
found that later stages of processing (as indexed by the P2 component) showed stronger 
activation for inanimate objects.  While a number of factors drive category-specific 
responses, Josephs and Konkle (2019) showed that later activity that is preferential to 
inanimate objects is associated with action-perception, especially when the objects 
contain explicit affordances (i.e., mug, hammer, light switch).  Recent neuroimaging 
work showed that when participants viewed graspable objects (compared to shapes), 
motor-related regions became more active.  While additional research is needed to 
understand these specific patterns of neural responses, the effects stemming from these 
conceptual stimulus dimensions may provide support for high-level organizational 
principles starting as early as 100ms post-stimulus onset.  
Conclusions  
Until recently, little research has investigated the impact of top-down processes 
(e.g., behavioral goals, task, attention) on the neural basis of visual object processing.  
The central premise of the study was that EEG could be used to provide insights on the 
dynamics of top-down and bottom-up signals in visual object processing by examnining 
when task impacts the extraction of informative visual features of the object.  More 
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specifically, we used ERPs as hard test for cognitive impenetrability. ERP analyses failed 
to reveal a significant interaction between the task and object processing.  Further 
analyses indicated that the relevance of the task was encoded within frontoparietal 
regions.  Additional work is necessary to fully understand the spatiotemporal dynamic 
effects of task on object representations.  We primarily focused on visual responses 
linked to the object at specific time windows in this study (early vs. late), but we know 
that both task and objects are processed in parallel.  The brain does not process the visual 
world in isolation, independent from context.  Future work should aim to dynamically 
explore task and object using multivariate approaches, which can better quantify the 
relationship between task and object processing over time and space.  Using the current 
paradigm, we can more closely examine visuotemporal responses to the task cue in 
addition to the object stimuli, which may yield additional insights into how task 
information and object representations are actively constructed, and dynamically interact 
throughout the cortex over time.  This work adds to the body of psychological and 
neuroscientific research examining how and when top down and bottom up signals 
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Representative examples of object stimuli used in this experiment (note: the objects are 
displayed upright in the figure below for ease of viewing; however, in the study there 
were 2 tilt variations (+45/-45) of each red and blue object); respective visual angle 
ranges for each object category presented below 
 
Visual Angle Range by Object Type 
Object Type Visual Angle Range 
 
Cow 5.37° - 5.96° 
Butterfly 4.93° - 6.08° 
Motorbike 5.35° - 5.65° 
Roller-skate 5.78° - 6.09° 












Appendix D  
 
ANOVA tables describing the latency (tables 1-3) and amplitude (tables 4-6) effects of 




Fixed effects ANOVA using P1 latency as the criterion (2x4x4) 
 














Hemisphere 564.77 1 564.77 1.03 .32 .03 
Task 396.01 3 132 1.42 .24 .05 
Object 1673.17 3 557.72 2.57 .06 .08 
Hemisphere x Taska 118.05 2.38 49.64 .64 .59 .02 
Hemisphere x Object 681.16 3 227.05 3.11 .03 .09 
Task x Objecta 1032.55 6.02 171.47 1.26 .28 .04 
Hemisphere x Task x Objecta 372.92 5.57 66.91 .71 .63 .02 




Fixed effects ANOVA using N1 latency as the criterion (2x4x4) 
 














Hemisphere 654.99 1 654.99 1.84 .19 .06 
Task 249.05 3 83.01 .99 .4 .03 
Object 2319.03 3 773.011 5.46 > .01** .16 
Hemisphere x Task 138.62 3 46.21 1.12 .35 .04 
Hemisphere x Object 669.56 3 223.19 3.27 .03* .1 
Task x Objecta 961.64 6 160.17 1.86 .09 .06 
Hemisphere x Task x Objecta 341.3 5.71 59.75 1.02 .41 .03 





Fixed effects ANOVA using P2 latency as the criterion (2x4x4) 
 
















Hemisphere 168.63 1 168.63 .35 .56 .01 
Task 1184.43 3 394.81 1.34 .27 .04 
Objecta 494.79 1.96 253.11 .34 .71 .01 
Hemisphere x Taska 308.94 2.31 134.01 .79 .47 .03 
Hemisphere x Objecta 310.24 2.15 114.49 .51 .62 .02 
Task x Objecta 4071.99 5.29 769.32 1.38 .23 .05 
Hemisphere x Task x Objecta 957.82 4.95 193.48 .82 .54 .03 




Fixed effects ANOVA using P1 amplitude as the criterion (2x4x4) 
 














Hemisphere 543.71 1 543.71 9.84 < .001*** .25 
Task 44.99 3 14.99 2.39 .07 .08 
Object 237.15 3 79.05 7.53 < .001*** .21 
Hemisphere x Task 4.08 3 1.36 1.36 .26 .05 
Hemisphere x Object 16.94 3 5.65 2.05 .11 .07 
Task x Object 84.08 9 9.34 1.51 .15 .04 
Hemisphere x Task x Objecta 8.19 5.8 1.41 1.22 .30 .04 
aGreenhouse Geisser used to correct for sphericity; * p > .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 5  
 
Fixed effects ANOVA using N1 amplitude as the criterion (2x4x4) 
 














Hemisphere .01 1 .005 .001 .99 .001 
Task 45 3 15 2.67 .05 .08 
Object 792.62 3 264.21 14.96 < .001*** .34 
Hemisphere x Task 1.68 3 .561 .81 .49 .03 
Hemisphere x Object 103.94 3 34.65 11.5 < .001*** .28 
Task x Object 61.74 9 6.86 1.14 .34 .04 
Hemisphere x Task x Object 2.19 9 .24 .29 .98 .01 




Fixed effects ANOVA using P2 amplitude as the criterion (2x4x4) 
 
















Hemisphere 1179.23 1 1179.23 21.02 < .001*** .42 
Task 7.63 3 2.54 .37 .78 .01 
Objecta 252.67 2.29 110.11 6.43 .01* .18 
Hemisphere x Task 2.89 3 .96 1.01 .39 .03 
Hemisphere x Object 29.15 3 9.72 3.95 .02* .12 
Task x Object 90.77 9 10.09 1.34 .22 .04 
Hemisphere x Task x Object 9.56 9 1.06 1.36 .21 .04 





Appendix E: ANOVA tables describing the latency (tables 7-9) and amplitude (tables 10-




Fixed effects ANOVA using P1 latency as the criterion (2x2x2x2) 
 














Hemisphere 282.39 1 282.39 1.03 .32 .03 
Task 27.19 1 27.19 .67 .42 .02 
Animacy 831.7 1 831.7 6.95 .01* .19 
Size 2.72 1 2.72 .03 .87 .001 
Hemisphere x Task 30.06 1 30.06 1.49 .23 .05 
Hemisphere x Animacy 69.48 1 69.48 1.67 .21 .06 
Task x Animacy 115.39 1 115.39 .3.39 .08 .12 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy 11.18 1 11.18 .503 .48 .02 
Hemisphere x Size 15.04 1 15.04 .91 .35 .03 
Task x Size 1.67 1 1.67 .03 .87 .001 
Hemisphere x Task x Size .57 1 .57 .02 .88 .001 
Animacy x Size 2.16 1 2.16 .02 .89 .001 
Hemisphere x Animacy x Size 256.06 1 256.06 4.98 .03* .15 
Task x Animacy x Size 54.09 1 54.09 .96 .33 .03 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy x Size 6.92 1 6.92 .28 .6 .01 





Fixed effects ANOVA using N1 latency as the criterion (2x2x2x2) 
 














Hemisphere 327.5 1 327.5 1.84 .19 .06 
Task .01 1 .01 < .001 .99 < .001 
Animacy 500.69 1 500.69 9.94 > .01** .26 
Size 605.39 1 605.39 6.49 .02* .18 
Hemisphere x Task 9.74 1 9.74 .65 .43 .02 
Hemisphere x Animacy .19 1 .19 .01 .93 < .001 
Task x Animacy 9.74 1 9.74 .22 .64 .01 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy .39 1 .39 .02 .88 .001 
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Hemisphere x Size 155.77 1 155.77 4.49 .04* .13 
Task x Size 106.94 1 106.94 6.06 .02* .17 
Hemisphere x Task x Size 14.02 1 14.02 .87 .36 .03 
Animacy x Size 53.44 1 53.44 .76 .39 .03 
Hemisphere x Animacy x Size 178.81 1 178.81 4.09 .05* .12 
Task x Animacy x Size 1.56 1 1.56 .04 .84 .002 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy x 
Size 
.13 1 .13 .01 .93 < .001 




Fixed effects ANOVA using P2 latency as the criterion (2x2x2x2) 
 














Hemisphere 84.31 1 84.31 .35 .56 .01 
Task 243.39 1 243.39 1.34 .26 .04 
Animacy 28.61 1 28.61 .07 .8 .01 
Size 7.64 1 7.64 .05 .82 .01 
Hemisphere x Task 5.37 1 5.37 .15 .69 .01 
Hemisphere x Animacy 105.1 1 105.1 1.06 .31 .04 
Task x Animacy 1.79 1 1.79 .01 .92 < .001 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy 16.82 1 16.82 .39 .54 .01 
Hemisphere x Size 15.39 1 15.39 .11 .74  .01 
Task x Size 26.74 1 26.74 .21 .65 .01 
Hemisphere x Task x Size .39 1 .39 .01 .84 < .001 
Animacy x Size 211.15 1 211.15 1.44 .24 .05 
Hemisphere x Animacy x Size 34.62 1 34.62 .52 .48 .02 
Task x Animacy x Size 14.02 1 14.02 .12 .72 .01 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy x Size 1.343 1 1.34 .04 .84 .01 




Fixed effects ANOVA using P1 amplitude as the criterion (2x2x2x2) 
 














Hemisphere 271.86 1 271.86 9.84 < .01** .25 
Task 1.46 1 1.46 .62 .44 .02 
Animacy 9.63 1 9.63 1.62 .21 .05 
Size 87.28 1 87.28 19.67 < .001*** .40 
Hemisphere x Task 1.27 1 1.27 2.37 .14 .08 
Hemisphere x Animacy 2.19 1 2.19 1.46 .24 .04 
Task x Animacy 3.92 1 3.92 .91 .35 .03 
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Hemisphere x Task x Animacy .001 1 .001 .002 .97 .001 
Hemisphere x Size 6.24 1 6.24 4.43 .04* .13 
Task x Size .11 1 .11 .04 .84 .001 
Hemisphere x Task x Size 1.13 1 1.13 3.69 .06 .11 
Animacy x Size 21.67 1 21.67 4.05 .05* .12 
Hemisphere x Animacy x Size .04 1 .04 .04 .85 .001 
Task x Animacy x Size .23 1 .23 .10 .75 .003 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy x 
Size 
.40 1 .40 .87 .36 .03 




Fixed effects ANOVA using N1 amplitude as the criterion (2x2x2x2) 
 














Hemisphere .002 1 .002 .001 .99 .001 
Task 7.04 1 7.04 2.77 .11 .09 
Animacy 302.57 1 302.57 27.62 < .001*** .49 
Size .24 1 .24 .03 .87 .001 
Hemisphere x Task .63 1 .63 1.73 .19 .06 
Hemisphere x Animacy 45.97 1 45.97 25.23 < .001*** .47 
Task x Animacy 2.6 1 2.6 .73 .4 .02 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy .002 1 .002 .004 .95 .001 
Hemisphere x Size 2.83 1 2.83 1.66 .21 .05 
Task x Size 4.24 1 4.24 1.08 .31 .04 
Hemisphere x Task x Size .19 1 .19 .99 .33 .03 
Animacy x Size 93.5 1 93.5 13.45 < .01** .32 
Hemisphere x Animacy x Size 3.17 1 3.17 3.19 .08 .09 
Task x Animacy x Size .001 1 .001 .001 .99 .001 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy x 
Size 
.29 1 .29 .84 .37 .03 




Fixed effects ANOVA using P2 amplitude as the criterion (2x2x2x2) 
 














Hemisphere 589.61 1 589.61 21.02 < .001*** .42 
Task 2.4 1 2.4 .69 .41 .02 
Animacy 52.99 1 52.99 5.29 .03* .15 
Size 69.54 1 69.54 25.88 < .001*** .47 
Hemisphere x Task .02 1 .02 .04 .85 .001 
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Hemisphere x Animacy .16 1 .16 .08 .78 .003 
Task x Animacy 13.21 1 13.21 3.19 .08 .09 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy 1.05 1 1.05 2.36 .135 .08 
Hemisphere x Size 5.28 1 5.28 7.07 .01* .19 
Task x Size 8.07 1 8.07 1.69 .203 .06 
Hemisphere x Task x Size 1.98 1 1.98 8.03 < .01** .22 
Animacy x Size 3.8 1 3.8 .55 .47 .02 
Hemisphere x Animacy x Size 9.14 1 9.14 8.82 < .01** .23 
Task x Animacy x Size .31 1 .31 .09 .76 .003 
Hemisphere x Task x Animacy x Size .06 1 .06 .16 .69 .005 






ANOVA tables describing the differential activity (as measured by area under the curve) 




Fixed effects ANOVA using AUC as the criterion 
 














Site 3856.32 1 3856.32 .08 .78 .003 
Task 57895.39 1 57895.39 .55 .47 .02 
Task Relevance 245712.73 1 245712.73 2.35 .14 .08 
Time 307079.17 1 307079.17 4.73 .04* .14 
Site x Task 37826 1 37826 .80 .38 .03 
Site x Task Relevance 6300.26 1 6300.26 .18 .68 .01 
Task x Task Relevance 279377.83 1 279377.83 2.27 .14 .07 
Site x Task x Task Relevance 73367.54 1 73367.54 1.54 .22 .05 
Site x Time 7252.09 1 7252.09 .30 .59 .01 
Task x Time 71473.87 1 71473.87 1.23 .28 .04 
Site x Task x Time 36157.37 1 36157.37 1.68 .21 .06 
Task Relevance x Time 350139.27 1 350139.27 3.83 .06 .12 
Site x Task Relevance x Time 37953.7 1 37953.7 1.99 .17 .06 
Task x Task Relevance x Time 32487.39 1 32487.39 .84 .37 .03 
Site x Task x Task Relevance x 
Time 
128731.42 1 128731.42 5.41 .03* .16 




Fixed effects ANOVA using AUC (within the animacy task) as the criterion 
 














Site 8763.53 1 8763.53 .28 .60 .01 
Task Relevance 524550.41 1 524550.41 3.95 .05* .12 
Time 41127.49 1 41127.49 .56 .46 .02 
Site x Task Relevance 297967.49 1 297967.49 2.43 .13 .08 
Site x Time 37897.83 1 37897.83 1.86 .18 .06 
Task Relevance x Time 84659.16 1 84659.16 1.98 .17 .06 
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Site x Task Relevance x Time 337425.55 1 337425.55 9.75 < 
.01** 
.25 




Fixed effects ANOVA using AUC (within the size task) as the criterion 
 














Site 32918.79 1 32918.79 .51 .48 .02 
Task Relevance 540.15 1 540.15 .01 .94 .001 
Time 297967.49 1 297967.49 3.42 .08 .12 
Site x Task Relevance 18334.27 1 18334.27 .32 .58 .01 
Site x Time 13443.82 1 13443.82 .49 .49 .02 
Task Relevance x Time 337425.55 1 337425.55 6.79 .01* .19 
Site x Task Relevance x Time 5511.63 1 5511.63 .22 .64 .008 




Fixed effects ANOVA using AUC (at the Oz site within the animacy task) as the 
criterion 
 















Task Relevance 113574.95 1 113574.95 1.58 .22 .05 
Time 33.01 1 33.01 .001 .98 .001 
Task Relevance x Time 5049.92 1 5049.92 .24 .63 .008 





Fixed effects ANOVA using AUC (at the CZ site within the animacy task) as the 
criterion 
 














Task Relevance 472308.99 1 472308.99 5.47 .03* .16 
Time 78992.30 1 78992.30 1.58 .22 .05 
Task Relevance x Time 232850.54 1 232850.54 6.26 .02* .18 
* p > .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Appendix G: ANOVA tables describing the behavioral (reaction time and accuracy) 
effects of individual task (4), individual objects category (4), and their interactions (tables 





Fixed effects ANOVA using RT amplitude as the criterion 
 














Taska 10528.91 2.42 4356.27 5.92 < .01** .15 
Objecta 84392.65 1.94 43538.45 8.91 < .001*** .24 
Task x Objecta 16159.83 6.46 2503.41 3.19 < .01** .09 




Fixed effects one-way ANOVA using RT examining object effects under each task  
 















Object (Naturalness) 20787.84 3 6929.28 5.51 < .01*** .16 
Object (Size)a 20409.89 2.08 9821.99 4.78 .01* .14 
Object (Color)a 45078.06 2.32 19455.51 14.97 < .001*** .34 
Object (Tilt)a 14276.68 2.31 6191.44 4.11 .02* .12 




Fixed effects ANOVA using Accuracy amplitude as the criterion 
 














Task .003 3 .001 .73 .54 .03 
Objecta .02 2.12 .01 4.38 .02* .13 
Task x Objecta .01 5.9 .002 .01 .46 .03 




Fixed effects ANOVA using RT (task type (2), animacy (2), size (2)) 
 














Task 2065.71 1 2065.71 4.93 .03* .15 
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Animacy 38905.17 1 38905.17 16.50 < .001*** .36 
Size 3012.83 1 3012.83 2.13 .16 .07 
Task x Animacy 1260.54 1 1260.54 4.42 .04* .13 
Task x Size 1580.30 1 1580.30 6.85 .01* .19 
Animacy x Size 278.33 1 278.33 .29 .59 .01 
Task x Animacy x Size 19.76 1 19.76 .11 .74 .004 




Fixed effects ANOVA using Accuracy (task type (2), animacy (2), size (2) 
 















Task < .001 1 < .001 .004 .95 .001 
Animacy .002 1 .002 1.77 .19 .06 
Size .01 1 .01 21.12 < .001*** .42 
Task x Animacy .001 1 .001 .81 .38 .03 
Task x Size < .001 1 < .001 .11 .74 .004 
Animacy x Size .001 1 .001 1.65 .21 .05 
Task x Animacy x Size < .001 1 < .001 .29 .59 .01 





Figure 1. Task by object average EEG waveforms for the left and right posterior lateral 
sites.  
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Figure 2. Averaged EEG waveforms for the left and right posterior lateral sites 
illustrating the effect of task (4) 
 
Figure 3. Averaged EEG waveforms for the left and right posterior lateral sites 
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Figure 4. Object category (4) effects on early visual ERP amplitudes (averaged across 




























Cow Butterfly Motorbike Skate



































Figure 5. The effect of object animacy on early visual ERP amplitude 
 




















































































































Figure 7. Examining differential activity for object category effects (animacy and size) 




Figure 8. A. Examining differential activity (as measured by area under the curve) for 
object category effects (animacy and size) across both task relevant and task irrelevant 
conditions in time (early and late) and space (Oz and Cz) 
 
Figure 9. B. Examining differential activity (as measured by area under the curve) for 
object category effects (animacy and size) across both task relevant and task irrelevant 


















































Differential Activity of Task Relevance for Animacy 

















































Differential Activity of Task Relevance Across Early and Late Time Windows 









Figure 10. A. Task by object effects on reaction time 
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